POWER AND STRENGTH

It is not to say that the weak state is a new issue. To elucidate the concept of weak state one might go as far back as Thucydides and the notorious Melian Dialogue stressing that the "strong do what they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept". A concept equalizing a state's power with its strength is the leitmotif through the long life of realism in international relations theory or the "power-politics" school of thought. Its focus is on the (nation-) state as the principal actor in international relations, and since the purpose of statecraft is survival in an anarchic (hostile) environment, the main goal is the acquisition of power. Security is perceived as national security and war with another state as the main threat. The position and relative security of any weak state is gauged in term of the specific international system in which it is operating. The weak state is discussed within a comparative system: great powers, middle powers, weak states, mini states. The main characteristic of weak states is their lack of power or strength. Strength is a relative, not absolute phenomenon. The main criteria for distinction between small (i.e. weak) and strong states are military power and geographical position as internal sources of weakness, and formal alliances and weak state-great power relations as external sources of weakness. Also, weak states frequently produce only a limited number of products. There are various possibilities for great powers to exploit the position of weak states, which have fewer choices in decision-making.

The problem with this approach is that it is impossible to have a "concise, precise and elegant statement", that is, a definition. "A very large set of criteria must be used. Some are easily quantified, while others are highly intuitive and qualitative." The weak states form the largest class of states and have the most diverse membership – a fact which makes it still more difficult to assign them any common denominator other then overall relative weakness.

The total power of a state is its internal and external power combined. Military power is measured through " 'effective population', that is, the part of the population which can be armed and educated to operate modern sophisticated weapons", possession of nuclear weapons, economic, industrial and social capacity. The indicators used to determine this are population, Gross National Product, GNP per capita, military expenditure and quantity of armed forces, energy reserves, production and consumption. In terms of geographical position, location and nature of terrain are important, but also "border pressure" - the number of neighbouring countries with which a common border is shared, their relative population ratios, their military strength, and their political intentions.

This approach does not provide clear guidance for comparison of similar-size states. Strength is here discussed only in terms of possible external threats, military and economic, from the system and region level. Although it was mentioned that the strength is not static, many elements of strength are relatively fixed: population, geographic position, terrain and so on. The ratio between multiple criteria is not clarified, except that "on the whole, weak states score relatively low on most criteria".

When implemented in five states in Western Balkans, this approach is not particularly revealing. Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro all are small states in terms of territory - less than 150.000 square kilometres, and in population – below 30 million. All five states have long borders, no nuclear weapons, low military expenditure, and no versatile production and export. In terms of external indicators, none of them is in NATO, that is in a formal alliance. There are some differences: Croatia has bigger GDP, Serbia and Montenegro the biggest territory and population, Albania the best terrain for defence, but there is no explanation as to which element has more weight. This concept includes many indicators without assigning value to them; hence it is too vague for finer comparison. Furthermore, there is no explanation as to how such permanent weakness becomes an acute security issue, except that it depends on great power politics.